{"id":14192,"date":"2018-04-05T13:21:18","date_gmt":"2018-04-05T21:21:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/elaw.org\/sentence-c-035-16-of-the-constitutional-court-of-colombia-alberto-castilla-et-al-v-colombia-8-february-2016\/"},"modified":"2024-07-17T10:59:15","modified_gmt":"2024-07-17T18:59:15","slug":"co_paramos_2018feb08","status":"publish","type":"resource","link":"https:\/\/elaw.org\/es\/resource\/co_paramos_2018feb08","title":{"rendered":"Sentencia C-035\/16 de la Corte Constitucional de Colombia (Alberto Castilla y otros Vs. Colombia) (8 de febrero de 2016)"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>*SPANISH BELOW*<\/p>\n<p>Sentence C-035\/16 of the Constitutional Court of Colombia (Alberto Castilla et al v. Colombia):<\/p>\n<p>Citizens presented constitutional claims against several provisions of the laws that approved the 2010-2014 National Development Plan (Law 1450 of 2011) and the 2014-2018 National Development Plan (Law 1753 of 2015).<\/p>\n<p>The Constitutional Court nullified a portion of Law 1753 that would have allowed existing license holders to extract minerals, oil, and gas in <em>p\u00e1ramos <\/em>(high-elevation wetlands), notwithstanding a general moratorium on mining activities in these ecologically important areas. Because <em>p\u00e1ramos <\/em>provide environmental services in regulating the hydrological cycle and sequestering carbon, which the Court characterized as \u201cfundamental to society\u201d (para. 142), the Court decided the government of Colombia must protect <em>p\u00e1ramos <\/em>as part of its duty to fulfill the fundamental constitutional rights to water and a healthy environment. The Court explained:\u201c[E]nvironmental protection prevails over economic rights acquired by private persons by means of environmental permits and concession contracts when it is proven that the activity produces harm, or when there is reason to apply the precautionary principle to avoid harm to non-renewable natural resources or to human health.\u201d\u00a0 Para. 128.<\/p>\n<p>The Court emphasized the importance of <em>p\u00e1ramos<\/em> for both climate change mitigation and adaptation.\u00a0 Regarding the former, the Court explained: \u201c<em>p\u00e1ramos<\/em> are carbon \u2018sinks\u2019, that is, they store and capture carbon from the atmosphere, according to the most conservative estimates, at least ten times more than tropical forests, whereby they contribute to the mitigate the effects of global warming\u201d; \u201c<em>p\u00e1ramos<\/em> play an important role in the mitigation of climate change in that they are natural deposits of carbon\u201d; and \u201cthey are strategic for contributing to mitigate climate change.\u201d\u00a0 Paras. 142, 149 &amp; 150.\u00a0 Regarding the importance of <em>p\u00e1ramos<\/em> for adaptation to the effects of climate change, the Court explained that these ecosystems are essential for regulating the hydrological cycle and providing consistent potable water in Colombia but are particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change; thus, they must be protected in order to adapt to climate change and effectively guarantee Colombians\u2019 fundamental right to water.\u00a0 Paras. 157-173.<\/p>\n<p>In addition, the Constitutional Court found additional provisions in Law 1753 to be unconstitutional because they deprived displaced victims of armed conflict of their right to seek restitution of their land. \u00a0The land had been appropriated for \u201cprojects of national strategic interest\u201d (designated by the Spanish acronym \u201cPINE\u201d) such as resource extraction and infrastructure development.\u00a0 The Court found \u201ca criterion of convenience, such as the case of the development of projects of national strategic interest, whose nature is purely economic, can not triumph over the protection of fundamental rights consecrated in benefit of subjects of special constitutional protection, as is the case of victims of armed conflict.\u201d\u00a0 Para. 73.\u00a0 The Court went on to strike down other parts of Law 1753 authorizing the government of Colombia to unilaterally expropriate land for projects of national strategic interest because the scope of said authority would impede rights to access to justice, to defense and to due process, and violates the constitutional principle of administrative efficiency.<\/p>\n<p>The Constitutional Court reviewed provisions in Law 1450 and Law 1753 that create and expand Strategic Mining Reserve Areas.\u00a0 The Court determined that the designation of Strategic Mining Reserve Areas does not commit these areas to be exclusively or necessarily used for mining and, therefore, does not infringe on constitutional mandates to protect agricultural workers, agricultural production, and the environment.\u00a0 As for the plaintiffs\u2019 allegations that those provisions creating and expanding Strategic Mining Reserve Areas violate constitutional principles of territorial autonomy, concurrent powers, and coordination, the Court determined that those provisions are compatible with such principles as long as the definition and concession of said areas are compatible with territorial planning instruments and local governments\u2019 constitutional authority to regulate land use, and as long as local governments are guaranteed a reasonable degree of participation in the selection and concession of said areas.\u00a0 The Court also declared constitutional the provision (section 2 of Art. 173 of Law 1753) that establishes the procedure for delimiting <em>p\u00e1ramos<\/em>, with the condition that if the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development diverges from the reference area established by the Alexander von Humboldt Institute for delimitation of <em>p\u00e1ramos<\/em>, it must explicitly base its decision upon a scientific criterion that provides a greater degree of protection.\u00a0 (All translations of direct quotes are unofficial.)<\/p>\n<p>Sentencia C-035\/16 de la Corte Constitucional de Colombia (Alberto Castilla y otros c\/ Estado de Colombia):<\/p>\n<p>Ciudadanos presentaron una demanda de inconstitucionalidad contra varias disposiciones de las leyes que aprobaron el Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2010-2014 (Ley 1450 de 2011) y el Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2014-2018 (Ley 1753 de 2015).<\/p>\n<p>La Corte Constitucional de Colombia declar\u00f3 la inconstitucionalidad de las disposiciones (incisos 1, 2 y 3 del primer par\u00e1grafo del art. 173 de la Ley 1753) que eximen de la prohibici\u00f3n general de no realizar actividades de explotaci\u00f3n en los p\u00e1ramos aquellos casos en que se hayan otorgado licencias ambientales antes de la promulgaci\u00f3n de dicha prohibici\u00f3n porque la especial importancia y vulnerabilidad ecol\u00f3gica de los p\u00e1ramos imponen una obligaci\u00f3n constitucional al estado de brindar una protecci\u00f3n especial para los mismos y porque el marco regulatorio no garantiza la protecci\u00f3n especial de los p\u00e1ramos, lo cual vulnera los derechos a un ambiente sano y al agua.\u00a0 La Corte explic\u00f3 que \u201cla protecci\u00f3n del ambiente prevalece frente a los derechos econ\u00f3micos adquiridos por particulares mediante licencias ambientales y contratos de concesi\u00f3n en las circunstancias en que est\u00e9 probado que la actividad produce un da\u00f1o, o cuando exista m\u00e9rito para aplicar el principio de precauci\u00f3n para evitar un da\u00f1o a los recursos naturales no renovables y a la salud humana.\u201d\u00a0 P\u00e1rr. 128. \u00a0La Corte resalt\u00f3 dos servicios ambientales prestados por los p\u00e1ramos \u201cque son fundamentales para la sociedad\u201d: la regulaci\u00f3n del ciclo h\u00eddrico y el secuestro del carbono.\u00a0 P\u00e1rr. 142.<\/p>\n<p>La Corte resalt\u00f3 la importancia de los p\u00e1ramos para mitigar el cambio clim\u00e1tico y para adaptar a los efectos del mismo.\u00a0 Con respecto a la mitigaci\u00f3n del cambio clim\u00e1tico, la Corte explic\u00f3: \u201clos p\u00e1ramos son \u2018sumideros\u2019 de carbono, es decir, almacenan y capturan carbono proveniente de la atm\u00f3sfera, seg\u00fan los c\u00e1lculos m\u00e1s conservadores, al menos diez veces m\u00e1s que los bosques tropicales, con lo cual contribuyen a mitigar los efectos del calentamiento global\u201d; \u201clos p\u00e1ramos juegan un rol importante en la mitigaci\u00f3n del cambio clim\u00e1tico en tanto que se trata de dep\u00f3sitos naturales de carbono\u201d; y \u201cel p\u00e1ramo no solo debe ser protegido en tanto que es un recurso de la naturaleza, sino en atenci\u00f3n a los servicios ambientales que presta, los cuales resultan estrat\u00e9gicos para contribuir a mitigar el cambio clim\u00e1tico\u201d.\u00a0 P\u00e1rrs. 142, 149 &amp; 150 (nota de pie de p\u00e1gina omitida).\u00a0 En cuanto a la importancia de los p\u00e1ramos para adaptar a los efectos de cambio clim\u00e1tico, la Corte concluy\u00f3 que estos ecosistemas son esenciales para la regulaci\u00f3n del ciclo hidrol\u00f3gico y la provisi\u00f3n constante de agua potable en Colombia pero son especialmente vulnerable a los efectos de cambio clim\u00e1tico, y por ende deber\u00e1n ser protegidos para adaptar a los efectos de cambio clim\u00e1tico y garantizar efectivamente el derecho fundamental al agua. P\u00e1rrs. 157-173.<\/p>\n<p>La Corte tambi\u00e9n declar\u00f3 la inconstitucionalidad de las dispocisiones (inciso 2 y el par\u00e1grafo del art. 50 de la Ley 1753) que restringen la restituci\u00f3n de tierras en predios en los que haya proyectos de inter\u00e9s nacional y estrat\u00e9gicos (PINE) porque violan los derechos reforzados de las v\u00edctimas del conflicto armado. \u00a0La Corte consider\u00f3 que \u201cun criterio de conveniencia, como es el caso de la realizaci\u00f3n de proyectos de inter\u00e9s estrat\u00e9gico nacional, cuya naturaleza es puramente econ\u00f3mica, no puede sobreponerse a la protecci\u00f3n de los derechos fundamentales consagrados a favor de sujetos de especial protecci\u00f3n constitucional, como es el caso de las v\u00edctimas del conflicto armado.\u201d\u00a0 P\u00e1rr. 73.\u00a0 La Corte tambi\u00e9n declar\u00f3 la inconstitucionalidad de la disposici\u00f3n (inciso 3 del art. 49 de la Ley 1753) que autoriza la expropiaci\u00f3n de tierras requeridas para el desarrollo de los PINE porque la indeterminaci\u00f3n sobre el alcance de dicha facultad de expropiaci\u00f3n impide el ejercicio de los derechos de acceso a la administraci\u00f3n de justicia, a la defensa y al debido proceso y atenta contra el principio constitucional de eficiencia en la gesti\u00f3n administrativa.\u00a0 La Corte tambi\u00e9n declar\u00f3 la inconstitucionalidad de la disposici\u00f3n (art. 51 de la Ley 1753) que asigna a una autoridad nacional la competencia exclusiva de tramitar licencias ambientales requeridas para los PINE porque vulnera el principio de autonom\u00eda de las Corporaciones Aut\u00f3nomas Regionales para la gesti\u00f3n de sus intereses, el principio de participaci\u00f3n democr\u00e1tica de los ciudadanos, y los principios de coordinaci\u00f3n y rigor subsidiario en materia ambiental sin justificaci\u00f3n suficiente.<\/p>\n<p>La Corte declar\u00f3 la constitucionalidad de las disposiciones (art. 108 de la Ley 1450 and art. 20 de la Ley 1753) que crean y ampl\u00edan la figura de las \u00c1reas de Reserva Estrat\u00e9gicas Mineras, con las condiciones de que (i) en relaci\u00f3n con las \u00e1reas de reserva ya definidas, la autoridad competente deber\u00e1 concertar con las autoridades locales antes del inicio del proceso de selecci\u00f3n objetiva de las \u00e1reas de concesi\u00f3n minera, (ii) la autoridad competente para definir las \u00e1reas de reserva deber\u00e1 concertar previamente con las autoridades locales para garantizar que no se afecte su facultad constitucional para reglamentar los usos del suelo, conforme a los principios de coordinaci\u00f3n, concurrencia y subsidiariedad, y (iii) en cualquier caso, las autoridades deber\u00e1n garantizar que la definici\u00f3n y oferta de dichas \u00e1reas sean compatibles con los planes de ordenamiento territorial.\u00a0 La Corte tambi\u00e9n declar\u00f3 constitucional la disposici\u00f3n (inciso 2 del art. 173 de la Ley 1753) que establece el procedimiento para delimitar los p\u00e1ramos, con la condici\u00f3n de que si el Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible se aparta del \u00e1rea de referencia establecida por el Instituto Alexander von Humboldt en la delimitaci\u00f3n de los p\u00e1ramos, debe fundamentar expl\u00edcitamente su decisi\u00f3n en un criterio cient\u00edfico que provea un mayor grado de protecci\u00f3n del p\u00e1ramo.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>*SPANISH BELOW* Sentence C-035\/16 of the Constitutional Court of Colombia (Alberto Castilla et al v. Colombia): Citizens presented constitutional claims against several provisions of the laws that approved the 2010-2014 National Development Plan (Law 1450 of 2011) and the 2014-2018 National Development Plan (Law 1753 of 2015). The Constitutional Court nullified a portion of Law [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","resource-topic":[42,43,74,86,2043,917],"resource-type":[528],"resource-category":[30097],"content-for-websites":[30101],"region":[671,541],"class_list":["post-14192","resource","type-resource","status-publish","hentry","resource-topic-biodiversity","resource-topic-climate-change","resource-topic-human-rights","resource-topic-mining","resource-topic-right-to","resource-topic-water","resource-type-cases","resource-category-legal","content-for-websites-climate","region-colombia","region-south-america"],"blocksy_meta":[],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/elaw.org\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/resource\/14192","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/elaw.org\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/resource"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/elaw.org\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/resource"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/elaw.org\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/8"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/elaw.org\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=14192"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/elaw.org\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=14192"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"resource-topic","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/elaw.org\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/resource-topic?post=14192"},{"taxonomy":"resource-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/elaw.org\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/resource-type?post=14192"},{"taxonomy":"resource-category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/elaw.org\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/resource-category?post=14192"},{"taxonomy":"content-for-websites","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/elaw.org\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/content-for-websites?post=14192"},{"taxonomy":"region","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/elaw.org\/es\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/region?post=14192"}],"curies":[{"name":"gracias","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}